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We argue that with interdependent utility functions growth can lead to a decline in total 
welfare of a society if the gains from growth are sufficiently unequally distributed in the 
presence of negative externalities, i.e., envy. 
JEL Code: D62, D63, D64, O00. 







Department of Economics 






Department of Mathematics 
San Diego State University 
5500 Campanile Drive 








  We explore the implications of economic growth for welfare in the presence of 
interdependent utility functions with negative externalities in consumption, i.e. envy. In 
conventional theory, the utility function of a "typical" economic agent is generally 
assumed to be independent of the consumption of others; hence more consumption 
invariably "...leads to more happiness" not only of the individual, but in the aggregate as 
well. According to the common wisdom, economic growth leads invariably to an increase 
in welfare (Layard and Walter, 1978, p. 5). Yet, experimental evidence refutes the notion 
that people invariably feel better off with increased consumption (Easterlin, 1974; 
Abramovitz, 1979; p. 9).
1
  Our paper assumes that "...the individual does not think and act in the same way 
irrespective of whether he is or is not a member of a group" (Weisskopf, 1971, p. 161; 
Katona, 1975, p. 49; Leibenstein, 1950: Frank 1985; McCracken, 1988, p. xi; Konrad, 
1990). "Reference groups" are important for providing standards for the subjective 
evaluation of one's own well-being, and in formulating expectations and aspirations on 
which satisfaction frequently depends.
2 Thus, "...people's standards of wealth are 
determined by comparisons with kin, peers, etc., and thus if they all rise together [over 
time] the relative difference disappears, and so as people get wealthier over time they 
do not become any more happy" (Furnham and Lewis, 1986, p. 109). 
  This skepticism toward the received wisdom is shared by an increasing number of 
researchers (Sen, 1977; Hammond, 1989; Konrad, 1992a), but interdependent utility 
functions have been formulated ever since the publication of Veblen's seminal theory of 
conspicuous consumption
3 (1899; Mishan, 1961; Frank, March 1985; Bagwell and 
2 Bernheim, 1996; Postlewaite, 1998). Duesenberry "...specifie[d] utility of an individual as 
a function of his own income and that of the income of the other members of the 
society"
4 (Duesenberry, 1949, p. 97). Admittedly, consumption can also have positive 
externalities: for example, a wife's utility can enter the utility function of her spouse 
altruistically (Becker, 1981). 
  Empirical and theoretical investigations of the social nature of utility functions are 
important for several reasons: the "neglect of interdependence of welfare functions may 
substantially bias policy conclusions" (Kapteyn and Herwaarden, 1980, p. 395); it also 
has major implications for progressive taxation (Feldstein, 1976, p. 81; Ng, 1987), for 
income redistribution, for the formulation of growth policy, as well as for the justification 
of the existence of the welfare state in general (Freshtman, Murphy, Weiss, 1966; 
Hammond, 1991).
5 We proceed in this vein, and explore some implications of economic 
growth for welfare in the presence of interdependent utility functions following 
Feldstein's formulation.
6 We demonstrate that, contrary to standard theory, growth need 
not raise aggregate welfare, if its benefits accrue unevenly, and if the utility functions of 
the population are interdependent (Konrad, 1992b).  
2. The Model 
  We begin with a model in which the society is assumed to be composed of two 
individuals A and B with interdependent Cobb-Douglas utility functions with one good, x, 
(i.e., income).
7
1)  UA = (xAαa) / (xBβa)    ;    UB = (xBαb) / (xAβb). 
The social welfare function is assumed to be additive and democratic: 
3 2) UT = UA + UB. 
Suppose that national income increases exogenously, e.g. through the discovery of new 
resources. Assume, that the increment in x accrues only to A. The question is under what 
circumstances, if any, might economic growth lead to a decline in total welfare, contrary 
to standard analysis (McAdams, 1992). 
Noting that 
3)  UT/ xA =   αa UA /xA - βb UB/xA  ∂ ∂
we obtain that the aggregate utility of the society decreases if and only if 
4)   UA/UB < βb/αa. 
  The outcome depends on the relative magnitudes of the terms on the two sides of 
this inequality. The right hand side is an index of the degree of interdependence of the 
utility functions, while the left hand side measures the inequality in the initial distribution 
of utility. The initial income distribution determines UA/UB, and hence whether it is 
smaller than βb/αa. The stronger is the interdependence, i.e. the larger is the value of 
βb/αa, the larger is the range of utility values for which inequality (4) holds. 
 The  ratio  βb/αa indicates the extent to which the consumption of x by A decreases 
B's utility as compared with the extent that it increases A's own utility. The size of the 
ratio is indicative of the degree to which members of society may be characterized as 
"envious" (β) relative to being self-contained (α). The larger is the ratio, the stronger is 
the interdependence. Without interdependence β = 0 and the ratio on the right hand side 
is zero, making it impossible for inequality (4) to ever hold, since the left hand side is 
always positive. In an altruistic society β < 0, and again the inequality becomes 
4 impossible. Consequently, in these two cases we have the standard conclusion that 
growth always increases total welfare. If β > 0, however, the inequality can hold provided 
the ratio of utility levels is less than βb/αa. The case βb/αa > 1 corresponds to the 
unrealistic case of a society in which enviousness dominates over self-centeredness.
8 
Hence, we assume that 0 < βb/αa < 1. 
  In this parameter range, growth can lead to a diminution in total social welfare in 
the two person case provided the gain accrues to the individual whose utility is initially 
lower by a sufficient ratio. This result becomes understandable by noting that in this 
model a part of the utility of the "wealthier" person, B, is derived from his relative 




  The main conclusion from the above example is that there exists a region of 
parameter space where an exogenous increase in income which changes the distribution 
of income, decreases total welfare in a democratic aggregate utility function. One should 
note that this conclusion is dependent on the assumed form of the utility function. In 
particular, if we repeat the analysis with U' = ln U, where U is as in eq. 1., the conclusion 
changes and welfare increases in response to growth with any income distribution 
provided only that βb < αa, as expected. On the other hand, replacing the Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions (eq. 1) with Stone-Geary, or, in fact, with separable utility functions of 
the form 
5)      UA = UA / UB
δa
    ;    UB = UB / UA
δb
 . 
5 where U indicates the utility of a consumer at some fixed level of utility for the other 
consumer,
10 we obtain that total welfare can decrease provided
11
6)   UA/UB < δb. 
The parameter δb now plays the role of βb/αa. 
3. Conclusion 
  The above model explores the welfare implications of economic growth in a society composed of 
individuals with interdependent utility functions with negative externalities in consumption. We 
demonstrate that there do exist specifications of utility functions with regions of parameter space in which 
the welfare consequences of a rise in per-capita income are ambiguous, if the gains are distributed 
unequally. Hence, economic growth might bring about an increase as well as a decrease in aggregate social 
welfare depending on the relationship between the two indices in eq. 4. One index measures the extent of 
envy in the society and the other the degree of income inequality as measured by the initial ratio of utilities. 
Total welfare is more likely to decrease if the gains from growth accrue disproportionately to the individual 
with the lower level of utility, the more envious is the individual who does not benefit from growth, the less 
selfish is the individual who gains from growth, and the more unequally income is distributed initially. 
Cooper, García-Penalosa and Funk (2001) recently derived similar results. 
  These considerations are important, insofar as economic growth has been frequently associated with 
the skewing of the income distribution in favor of the upper income brackets. In an historical context, 
Simon Kuznets recognized this pattern for the early phases of modern economic growth (Kuznets, 1996, p. 
212; Williamson and Lindert, 1980, pp. 62, 67; Lindert, 1991, p,. 216; Williamson,  1985, p. 18; Williamson, 
1991, p. 15),  
12 and recent evidence confirms the increase in the Gini coefficient in Eastern Europe and the 
successor states of the Soviet Union during the recent transition to a market economy (Milanovic, 1996, p. 133). 
In many of these countries the Gini coefficient increased from 0.25 to 0.30 in just five years (United Nations 
Development, 1993, p. 17). In the United Kingdom a 2.1 percent growth rate  in per capita GNP between 1965 
and 1993 has been accompanied by a rise in the gini coeffienient from 0.25 to 0.32. (The World Bank, 1993). 
6 In most countries of the world a wide divide separates the poor from the rich. In the United States, for 
instance, the richest 20 percent of the population earns 9 times as much as the poorest 20 percent.
13 Hence, 
insofar as the benefits of economic growth often accrue unevenly, our theoretical considerations have 
practical policy implications. 
  Clearly, we analyzed a special case, and therefore, the result ought not be assumed to pertain 
generally. Nonetheless, our derivation does have far-reaching policy implications. One issue to explore is 
the extent to which the utility function of economic agents are interdependent. We have demonstrated that 
with gains of economic growth accruing unevenly, circumstances do exist such that a society could be better 
off either by choosing to forgo the opportunities for growth, or by government policy affecting  the 
distribution of gains. Thus, there is room for government intervention. The reason for the existence of the 
welfare state is not only the amelioration of market failure, or the provision of comprehensive security, but 
also because of the existence of externalities in consumption – envy - imply that individual utility 
maximization does not automatically bring about utility maximization for the society. The society could be 
not only happier, but also more stable politically, with a more even distribution of the gains from growth, 
and a diminution in envy (Hammond, 1995). Our conclusion vividly redirects our focus from growth per se 
to its distributional consequences for aggregate welfare.
14 In sum, the interdependent nature of a society’s 
utility function should not be neglected in the formulation economic policy, particularly with regard to such 
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Footnotes 
                                     
1 Admittedly, in the short run "...one might feel happier by a recent increase in the standard of living, 
[but] one soon adapts to this and the positive relationship disappears." Hence, over time "...no strong 
positive relationship [has been found] either cross-sectionally or longitudinally between money 
11                                                                                                                    
[income] and happiness" (Furnham and Lewis, 1986, p. 109). We are not substantially happier than 
our ancestors even though we consume much more than they did (Scitovsky, 1976). 
2 As Duesenberry pointed out a generation ago, "the utility derived from one's own house or car 
depends on a friend's house or car" (1949, p. 27).  
3 Its main insight fits well the post-World War II U.S. private consumption experience (Bassman, 
Molina, and Slottje, 1988). 
4 Furthermore, the price of the consumed good can be included in the utility function, thus 
generating a "snob appeal" effect (Basmann, Molina, and Slottje, 1983; Haavelmo, 1970; Fisher, 
1977; Spiegel and Templeman, 1985; Frank 1987). 
5  For instance, Spiegel and Templeman have shown "...that a 'compulsory bundle' which a group... 
accepts as binding upon all its members might be superior to any other consumption pattern from the 
point of view of each and every member of the group" (1985, p. 315). Moreover, employees care 
about relative income within a firm, not only about their own absolute salaries (Frank 1984). 
6 In Feldstein's analysis initially UA = UB, and α=β (notation as in eq. 1). He finds that an increment 
accruing unequally between two members of a society raises social welfare. 
7 The presence of additional goods complicates the notation while leaving the analysis and 
conclusions unchanged. 
8 If the distribution of income is egalitarian to begin with (i.e. UB=UA), then social welfare is likely 
to increase. This follows, since in this case inequality (4) holds only if βb/αa >1 
9  We can extend the analysis of the model in eq. (1) to n individuals. We treat only the simplest case 
of a society with two types of individuals A and B. We assume that all type A (or type B) individuals 
have identical utility functions and are at identical levels of utility. If there are nA individuals of type 
A and nB individuals of type B, then the total democratic welfare function becomes UT = nAUA + 
nBUB. The constants nA and nB are carried through the derivation, yielding a modified form of 
12                                                                                                                    
UT = 
inequality (4): nAUA/nBUB < βb/αa. The larger is the number of individuals who do not partake in 
the benefits of growth relative to the number of individuals who do benefit, the smaller βb/αa can be 
and still allow the last inequality to be satisfied, implying a decline in welfare as a consequence of 
growth. 
  Note that similar inequalities also follow for non-democratic welfare functions if one 
reinterprets the coefficients nA and nB as the degrees to which society values the utility that accrues 
to persons A and B. The n person case also follows if the coefficients are again reinterpreted as the 
number of individuals times the degree to which the utility of such individuals is valued. Again, if 
the total initial welfare of the subgroup to which the gain accrues is sufficiently small as compared 
with the total welfare of the subgroup not enjoying gains, the total combined welfare of the two 
subgroups will decrease. Thus, there exist ways to apportion additional income to a population so as 
to decrease its total welfare. 
10 We require that the indifference curves of each consumer be unaffected by the consumption of the 
other. 
11 Once again, using a democratic welfare function and assuming that the gains accrue entirely to A 


























































1 which is negative provided    . If we note that  the inequality reduces 
to UA/UB < δb. 
13                                                                                                                    
12. This is the case partly because during economic growth gainers never compensate the losers whose 
marketable skills or investments became devalued.  
13 The comparable figure for Brazil is 32 (United Nations Development, 1993, p. 17). 
14 In addition, envy can have an influence on the growth process itself (Cole, Maliath, and 
Postelwaite, 1992). 
15 "If growth is less important for welfare than we have so far supposed, other goals would rise in the 
scale of social priorities" (Abramovitz, 1979, p. 20). 
14 CESifo Working Paper Series 




1405 Luisa Fuster, Ayşe  İmrohoroğlu and Selahattin İmrohoroğlu, Personal Security 
Accounts and Mandatory Annuitization in a Dynastic Framework, February 2005 
 
1406 Peter Claeys, Policy Mix and Debt Sustainability: Evidence from Fiscal Policy Rules, 
February 2005 
 
1407 James M. Malcomson, Supplier Discretion over Provision: Theory and an Application 
to Medical Care, February 2005 
 
1408 Thorvaldur Gylfason, Interview with Assar Lindbeck, February 2005 
 
1409 Christian Gollier, Some Aspects of the Economics of Catastrophe Risk Insurance, 
February 2005 
 
1410 Gebhard Kirchgässner, The Weak Rationality Principle in Economics, February 2005 
 
1411 Carlos José Fonseca Marinheiro, Has the Stability and Growth Pact Stabilised? 
Evidence from a Panel of 12 European Countries and Some Implications for the Reform 
of the Pact, February 2005 
 
1412 Petter Osmundsen, Frank Asche, Bård Misund and Klaus Mohn, Valuation of 
International Oil Companies –The RoACE Era, February 2005 
 
1413 Gil S. Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan, Lobbying and Compromise, February 2005 
 
1414 Marcel F. M. Canoy, Jan C. van Ours and Frederick van der Ploeg, The Economics of 
Books, February 2005 
 
1415 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Wößmann, Does Educational Tracking Affect 
Performance and Inequality? Differences-in-Differences Evidence across Countries, 
February 2005 
 
1416 George Kapetanios and M. Hashem Pesaran, Alternative Approaches to Estimation and 
Inference in Large Multifactor Panels: Small Sample Results with an Application to 
Modelling of Asset Returns, February 2005 
 
1417 Samuel Mühlemann, Jürg Schweri, Rainer Winkelmann and Stefan C. Wolter, A 
Structural Model of Demand for Apprentices. February 2005 
 
1418 Giorgio Brunello and Lorenzo Rocco, Educational Standards in Private and Public 
Schools, February 2005 
 
1419 Alex Bryson, Lorenzo Cappellari and Claudio Lucifora, Why so Unhappy? The Effects 
of Unionisation on Job Satisfaction, March 2005 
  
1420 Annalisa Luporini, Relative Performance Evaluation in a Multi-Plant Firm, March 2005 
 
1421 Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni, When the Union Hurts the Workers: A 
Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy, March 2005 
 
1422 Pieter Gautier, Michael Svarer and Coen Teulings, Marriage and the City, March 2005 
 
1423 Ingrid Ott and Stephen J. Turnovsky, Excludable and Non-Excludable Public Inputs: 
Consequences for Economic Growth, March 2005 
 
1424 Frederick van der Ploeg, Back to Keynes?, March 2005 
 
1425 Stephane Dees, Filippo di Mauro, M. Hashem Pesaran and L. Vanessa Smith, Exploring 
the International Linkages of the Euro Area: a Global VAR Analysis, March 2005 
 
1426 Hans Pitlik, Friedrich Schneider and Harald Strotmann, Legislative Malapportionment 
and the Politicization of Germany’s Intergovernmental Transfer System, March 2005 
 
1427 Konstantinos Angelopoulos and Apostolis Philippopoulos, The Role of Government in 
Anti-Social Redistributive Activities, March 2005 
 
1428 Ansgar Belke and Daniel Gros, Asymmetries in the Trans-Atlantic Monetary Policy 
Relationship: Does the ECB follow the Fed?, March 2005 
 
1429 Sören Blomquist and Luca Micheletto, Optimal Redistributive Taxation when 
Government’s and Agents’ Preferences Differ, March 2005 
 
1430 Olof Åslund and Peter Fredriksson, Ethnic Enclaves and Welfare Cultures – Quasi-
Experimental Evidence, March 2005 
 
1431 Paul De Grauwe, Roberto Dieci and Marianna Grimaldi, Fundamental and Non-
Fundamental Equilibria in the Foreign Exchange Market. A Behavioural Finance 
Framework, March 2005 
 
1432 Peter Egger, Stefan Gruber, Mario Larch and Michael Pfaffermayr, Knowledge-Capital 
Meets New Economic Geography, March 2005 
 
1433 George Economides and Apostolis Philippopoulos, Should Green Governments Give 
Priority to Environmental Policies over Growth-Enhancing Policies?, March 2005 
 
1434 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja, An Interview with Thomas J. Sargent, March 
2005 
 
1435 Helge Berger and Volker Nitsch, Zooming Out: The Trade Effect of the Euro in 
Historical Perspective, March 2005 
 




1437 Martin Kolmar and Volker Meier, Intra-Generational Externalities and Inter-
Generational Transfers, March 2005 
 
1438 M. Hashem Pesaran and Takashi Yamagata, Testing Slope Homogeneity in Large 
Panels, March 2005 
 
1439 Gjermund Nese and Odd Rune Straume, Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade 
Policy in Successive Oligopoly, April 2005 
 
1440 Tomer Blumkin and Efraim Sadka, A Case for Taxing Education, April 2005 
 
1441 John Whalley, Globalization and Values, April 2005 
 
1442 Denise L. Mauzerall, Babar Sultan, Namsoug Kim and David F. Bradford, Charging 
NOx Emitters for Health Damages: An Exploratory Analysis, April 2005 
 
1443 Britta Hamburg, Mathias Hoffmann and Joachim Keller, Consumption, Wealth and 
Business Cycles in Germany, April 2005 
 
1444 Kohei Daido and Hideshi Itoh, The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with 
Reference Dependent Preferences, April 2005 
 
1445 John Whalley, Rationality, Irrationality and Economic Cognition, April 2005 
 
1446 Henning Bohn, The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy in the United States, April 2005 
 
1447 Torben M. Andersen, Is there a Role for an Active Fiscal Stabilization Policy? April 
2005 
 
1448 Hans Gersbach and Hans Haller, Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption, 
April 2005 
 
1449 Jerome L. Stein, The Transition Economies: A NATREX Evaluation of Research, April 
2005 
 
1450 Raymond Riezman, John Whalley and Shunming Zhang, Metrics Capturing the Degree 
to which Individual Economies are Globalized, April 2005 
 
1451 Romain Ranciere, Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann, Systemic Crises and Growth, 
April 2005 
 
1452 Plutarchos Sakellaris and Focco W. Vijselaar, Capital Quality Improvement and the 
Sources of Growth in the Euro Area, April 2005 
 
1453 Kevin Milligan and Michael Smart, Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics, April 2005 
 
1454 Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, To Draft or not to Draft? Efficiency, 
Generational Incidence, and Political Economy of Military Conscription, April 2005 
 
  
1455 Maurice Kugler and Hillel Rapoport, Skilled Emigration, Business Networks and 
Foreign Direct Investment, April 2005 
 
1456 Yin-Wong Cheung and Eiji Fujii, Cross-Country Relative Price Volatility: Effects of 
Market Structure, April 2005 
 
1457 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Inequality and Relative Reliance on Tariffs: 
Theory and Evidence, April 2005 
 
1458 Monika Bütler, Olivia Huguenin and Federica Teppa, Why Forcing People to Save for 
Retirement may Backfire, April 2005 
 
1459 Jos Jansen, The Effects of Disclosure Regulation of an Innovative Firm, April 2005 
 
1460 Helge Bennmarker, Kenneth Carling and Bertil Holmlund, Do Benefit Hikes Damage 
Job Finding? Evidence from Swedish Unemployment Insurance Reforms, May 2005 
 
1461 Steffen Huck, Kai A. Konrad and Wieland Müller, Merger without Cost Advantages, 
May 2005 
 
1462 Louis Eeckhoudt and Harris Schlesinger, Putting Risk in its Proper Place, May 2005 
 
1463 Hui Huang, John Whalley and Shunming Zhang, Trade Liberalization in a Joint Spatial 
Inter-Temporal Trade Model, May 2005 
 
1464 Mikael Priks, Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France – Default 
Risk and Monitoring Costs, May 2005 
 
1465 François Ortalo-Magné and Sven Rady, Heterogeneity within Communities: A 
Stochastic Model with Tenure Choice, May 2005 
 
1466 Jukka Pirttilä and Sanna Tenhunen, Pawns and Queens Revisited: Public Provision of 
Private Goods when Individuals make Mistakes, May 2005 
 
1467 Ernst Fehr, Susanne Kremhelmer and Klaus M. Schmidt, Fairness and the Optimal 
Allocation of Ownership Rights, May 2005 
 
1468 Bruno S. Frey, Knight Fever – Towards an Economics of Awards, May 2005 
 
1469 Torberg Falch and Marte Rønning, The Influence of Student Achievement on Teacher 
Turnover, May 2005 
 
1470 John Komlos and Peter Salamon, The Poverty of Growth with Interdependent Utility 
Functions, May 2005 